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The purpose of this article is to assess and formalize the capacity of
retirement and pension fund management companies (AFJPs) to segment
the market by the income level of demand during 1995 and 2001. By
taking a profit maximization model whose specifications include a non-
linear price and a level of demand that is heterogeneous in terms of
income level, and by then corroborating this empirically, we confirm the
hypothesis that the market was segmented by the management companies
and we identify two groups of firms. The first comprised companies that
established a high fixed commission and a low variable one with a view
to capturing high-income affiliates, while the second group consisted of
firms that used the opposite pricing policy to attract low- and medium-
income affiliates. The effect was to reduce direct competition between
the two groups of firms.
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I
Introduction
In July 1994, the Integrated Pensions System (Sistema
Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (SIJP)) came into
operation in Argentina. It consisted of two regimes:
the old public regime, based on a pay-as-you-go system
managed by the National Social Security
Administration (ANSES), and a new regime based on
individual capitalization and managed by private-
sector companies: the retirement and pension fund
management companies (AFJPs), supervised and
regulated by the Superintendency of Retirement and
Pension Fund Management Companies (SAFJP). By
December 2002, some 80% of potential contributors
had opted to switch to the private-sector regime.
The main objective of the SIJP is to cover the
contingencies of old age, disability and death. In
pursuit of this common objective, the function of the
private-sector capitalization system is to provide the
working active population with mechanisms for
choosing between fund management companies. In
addition, each AFJP manages its affiliates’ contributions
and receives payment in return. Until December 2001
this payment (commission) consisted of a set fee in
pesos plus a variable component proportional to the
affiliate’s taxable income; in that month, however, the
set fee was abolished.
The legislation under which the new system was
established places certain constraints on private-sector
service providers. The organizations owning the
capital of AFJPs in Argentina fall into four broad
categories: public-sector banks, foreign-owned
companies (banks and enterprises), insurance
companies, and companies created by trade unions.
To trade actively, AFJPs have to have initial capital of
at least 3 million pesos and maintain a reserve
investment equivalent to 1.5 million pesos or 1% of
the total pension funds under their management.
Potential system demand encompasses everyone
over the age of 18, whether employees or self-
employed. The rules require workers to choose
between the two systems available, the pay-as-you-
go system or the private-sector capitalization system,
automatically transferring to the latter anyone who
fails to state a preference. Those choosing the pay-as-
you-go regime are entitled to change their minds and
join the private individual capitalization regime.
However, those opting for individual capitalization
have not had an equivalent right, although they are
entitled to switch AFJP.
In all cases, once the choice has been stated,
membership is compulsory and the affiliate has to pay
in a monthly amount calculated as a percentage of his
or her regular monthly salary.
The concern for both regulators and researchers in
this type of market is to understand the competition
mechanisms operating there and develop incentive
structures to minimize market failures. The ultimate
aim is to reconcile social interests (the generation of
savings and the provision of funds for retirees and
pensioners) with the objectives of the firms supplying
the sector. For this, it is necessary to identify the factors
that determine pricing in the market, the behaviour of
companies, and the strategic interaction among them
and between them and the supervisor.
In particular, the objective of this study is to
ascertain the degree, trend and causes of market
concentration. Another aim is to gauge the ability of
companies to segment the market by the
characteristics of demand in order to reduce
competition between them. To this end, section II
discusses the theoretical framework of analysis,
Section III looks at the size of the market and the
concentration ratio, Section IV develops a model for
maximizing a firm’s profits through price selection
in a market with heterogeneous demand, Section V
presents the empirical results and section VI, lastly,
sets out the main conclusions reached.
The author wishes to thank Eugenia Barbieri and Daniel
Maceira for their valuable comments. He is also grateful to
Hugo Bertín and Roberto Calvo, both members of the AFJP
Superintendency, for their comments and the information
supplied. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of
the author.
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II
The theoretical framework
Oligopolistic markets are characterized by the presence
of a small number of interdependent firms. Companies
have to be alert for both aggressive moves and
defensive responses by their rivals. In this environment,
the partial equilibrium solution can take two forms,
one of collusion, with the participants reaching explicit
or implicit agreement on pricing and/or quantities, and
one of non-collusion, in which firms lack significant
information on their rivals’ behaviour and reactions
and act competitively, employing a dominant strategy
(pricing or quantities) that leads towards a Nash
equilibrium in each of the subgames.
Companies participating in a highly concentrated
industry have incentives to set prices higher than their
marginal cost of production, with a view to
appropriating profits that are greater than they would
be in a situation of perfect competition. The
relationship between the concentration ratio and
company behaviour is not one-way, however. Given
the underlying market conditions and a particular
concentration ratio, companies act strategically and
their decisions affect the structure of the market.
Pricing policies and strategies may prove to be
the main tool available to a company in its efforts to
expand, weather a crisis or even survive. Again, each
company’s pricing power, and the desirability of using
it, will depend on the degree of competition, the
characteristics of the goods and services it provides,
the ability of consumers to keep abreast of the
immediately available alternatives, and the cost
structure.
If companies are dealing with consumers who have
differing characteristics in terms of tastes, income level,
willingness to pay, location, etc., they will have
incentives to behave in different ways that reflect these
characteristics. For example, if companies see that there
are two groups of consumers who differ in their
willingness to pay, they might set differentiated prices,
charging more for consumption carried out by those
individuals who have greater spending power.
In situations where consumers can be
differentiated by income level and/or willingness to
pay, setting non-linear prices1  can be a tool for price
discrimination between them. Firms operating in a
highly concentrated market, with groups of consumers
differentiated by income level, might find alternative
mechanisms to allow them to stay in the market and
achieve extraordinary profits. These mechanisms might
include the use of price discrimination to segment
markets by the characteristics of demand, and product
differentiation of both a vertical and a horizontal
nature. Thus, diversity (in both the product and the
type of consumer) weakens competition and is a major
factor in the creation of non-competitive trading
environments.
The ability of firms to segment the market or
differentiate their product depends on the degree of
dispersion in the characteristics of demand. According
to Shaked and Sutton (1987), the more dispersed
consumer incomes or tastes are, the greater the scope
for competing firms to identify market niches and
specialize. When demand is more homogeneous, on
the other hand, preferences and the ability to pay vary
less, so the supply becomes relatively standardized.
In markets with strong oligopolistic characteristics,
therefore, participating firms could differentiate the
demand bracket they supply in order to head off
commercial or price wars.
1
 A non-linear price is the sum of a fixed price (independent of
the amount consumed) and a variable price proportional to the
amount consumed.
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III
Market size and concentration
When studying the structure of a market and the
competitive strategies of the companies involved in it,
the first requirement is to define the market concerned.
There are two stages to this. The first is to identify the
market for the product, encompassing the different goods
or services that compete or could compete with one
another, and to establish where substitution might take
place. The second concerns the geographical aspect,
since the geographical scale of the market will determine
the strategies of the companies operating there.
What AFJPs do is to manage a pension fund by
creating a portfolio of assets. To this end, they receive a
sum of money from their affiliates during their working
years. The main objective of the management companies
is to maximize the return on these funds by constructing
a portfolio of different assets, which may include bonds
issued by the country’s government, negotiable
instruments, term deposits, the shares of privatized
enterprises and limited-liability companies, common
investment funds, etc. At retirement, the worker will
receive a monthly income from the individual fund built
up plus the returns obtained by investing these savings.
Geographically, the relevant market will be
considered to consist of the entire territory of the country,
since most AFJPs compete nationally, the exceptions being
a handful that operate in particular provinces.2
Table 1 shows the number of affiliates and
contributors for each firm as of December 1995 and
March 2004, and the percentage change between the
two periods. Companies are ranked by the fifth column
(percentage change in the number of affiliates). The
information shown reveals an increase of 119% in the
total number of affiliates between 1995 and 2004, while
the number of contributors increased by only 54%. The
large rise in the number of affiliates is due to the transfer
of workers from the old public-sector system.
Because the two variables did not grow at the same
rate over the period studied, the contributor/affiliate
ratio fell. This ratio can be treated as an indicator of
operational sustainability in that, while a firm only
receives income from those paying in, it has to incur
costs for all its affiliates, so that a better contributor/
affiliate ratio will mean better performance in relation
to its peers.3
Figure 1 presents quarterly changes in this ratio for
the system as a whole. The number of affiliates grew by
more than the number of contributors. In March 2004,
3.6 million affiliates actually paid their contributions,
giving a contributor/affiliate ratio of 37%. The gap can
be put down to both personal reasons (evasion by
affiliates) and the nature of the labour market (informal
working): contributors stop paying into the system once
they cease to be active or formal workers.
It is possible, however, to identify two periods in
which the trend of the contributor/affiliate ratio altered
marginally. The first shift was in March 1999, when
the ratio fell. This was associated, however, with
information processing problems at the SAFJP. The
second shift can be identified in December 2001, when
the Argentine economy abandoned its currency’s fixed
parity against the dollar in the midst of an economic,
political and social crisis.
Following the introduction of the new system in
July 1994, 26 AFJPs were authorized to start operations.
This number then fell substantially, however: 17 firm
were operating in the market in December 1997 and
just 12 remained in the system by December 2002.
The reduction in the number of management
companies does not necessarily mean greater
concentration in the market; rather, it points to changes
in each firm’s participation in the industry. To give an
idea of the degree of concentration in the industry,
figure 2 presents the index of concentration to the fourth
firm4  for the “affiliates” and “contributors” variables.
2
 This is the case with Unidos, which basically operates in the
province of Córdoba, and Met, which chose to concentrate on
major urban areas, chiefly the City of Buenos Aires, when it
entered the market.
3
 Although AFJPs provide significantly fewer services to non-
contributors than to contributors, the former are included in
these companies’ cost function.
4
 The indicator to the fourth firm is produced by taking the
four firms with the most affiliates at a given point in time. An
alternative indicator of concentration is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, which fulfils the axioms referred to. This
indicator yields similar results, in terms of both levels and
tendency, to those obtained by calculating the ratio of
concentration to the fourth firm. This suggests that there is no
bias in the choice of N = 4, while revealing the significant
weight of the top four firms in the structure of the market.
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TABLE 1
Argentina: Number of affiliates and contributors and percentage change
AFJP Affiliates Contributors Affiliates Contributors Change affiliates Change contributors
Dec. 1995 Dec. 1995 Mar. 2004 Mar. 2004 % %
Profesión 16 978 10 090 212 321 73 318 1 151 627
Unidos 18 919 13 390 208 787 73 485 1 004 449
Arauca Bit 82 050 42 684 673 350 300 062 721 603
Orígenes 501 922 247 871 2 323 659 820 287 363 231
Prorenta 98 912 46 461 437 739 134 010 343 188
Futura 43 368 33 563 162 160 47 279 274 4 1
Previsol 130 605 68 008 322 545 105 178 147 5 5
Consolidar 651 750 352 484 1 520 665 602 703 133 71
Siembra 593 709 302 949 1 342 857 491 305 126 62
Máxima 620 516 310 350 1 335 087 487 457 115 57
Nación 471 755 215 885 828 319 316 351 76 47
Activa 131 975 61 702 0 0 –100 –100
Afianzar 21 516 10 209 0 0 –100 –100
Activa–Anticipar 141 125 63 936 0 0 –100 –100
Banat 462 0 0 0 –100 0
Claridad 257 381 114 862 0 0 –100 –100
Ethika 2 048 1 117 0 0 –100 –100
Ethika–Jacarandá 60 594 23 105 0 0 –100 –100
Fecunda 146 519 67 174 0 0 –100 –100
Generar 36 450 22 745 0 0 –100 –100
Más Vida 66 649 16 103 0 0 –100 –100
Patrimonio 127 117 56 390 0 0 –100 –100
Previnter 370 022 199 552 0 0 –100 –100
San José 27 462 15 284 0 0 –100 –100
Savia 46 688 11 562 0 0 –100 –100
Met 0 211 435 106 240
Total affiliates 4 371 876 2 307 476 9 578 924 3 557 675 119 54
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FIGURE 1
Argentina: System-wide contributor/affiliate ratio,
December 1995 to March 2004
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This indicator of concentration was constructed
for the two key market variables: the number of affiliates
and the number of contributors. It was chosen because:
(i) the data needed to construct it were accessible;
(ii) the result was independent of the size of the industry;
(iii) the result was influenced by mergers and takeovers
in the market; and (iv) the entry or exit of one firm of
significant size had a negative or positive effect on the
concentration index (Curry and George, 1983).
The results obtained reveal that the AFJP market
has gone through a significant process of
concentration. As a result, the top four firms have come
to dominate its development. Thus, the index of
concentration to the fourth firm for affiliates and
contributors increased by 26% and 28%, respectively,
between 1995 and March 2004. The rise was not even,
however, throughout the period studied. During the
market’s first four years of existence, the degree of
concentration increased gradually as a consequence
of mergers and acquisitions plus the effects of the
mechanism used to allocate “undecideds”.
The subsequent decline in concentration, which
took place between September 1998 and December
2000, was linked to the change in the system for
distributing “undecideds” and a drop in the number of
takeovers. Up to June 1998, the contributions of people
who were obliged as employees to pay into a pension
fund but had not chosen their system or AFJP were
distributed in proportion to the market shares of the
different management companies. From that month
onward, these contributions began to be allocated by
lot among all the companies. This is indicative of how
important the regulator is in the structure of the market,
as it is able to generate a kind of “derived demand”.
The trend began to change again in 2001,
however, when Orígenes took over the whole of the
Previnter customer portfolio. This operation was highly
significant, as the firm acquired had a large share of
the market (8%), while Orígenes had 19%.
Another major shift was caused by the entry of
Met into the market in March 2001. The importance of
this event is that it shows that any barrier to entry erected
in the face of a credible “threat” of potential new
entrants can be overcome.
The way the contributions of “undecideds” were
distributed between firms changed again in December
2001, when they began to be shared out between the
two firms with the lowest prices. This did not have a
significant effect on market concentration.
Table 2 lists takeovers and new entries by company
and date. The AFJP market in Argentina has gone
through a significant process of concentration, in
which the top four firms have taken 72% of the market.
This can be put down both to the number of mergers
and acquisitions in the industry and to the rules


































































































































Argentina: Index of concentration to the fourth firm,
December 1995 to March 2004
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“undecideds”. The entry of Met in March 2001,
however, raised the potential threat of new
competitors.
It is often observed that as concentration in an
industry increases, the profits of the companies
operating there steadily rise. Again, underlying market
conditions, such as size, the income distribution of
potential customers or the regulatory framework in
place, influence the structure of supply and the
strategies which companies follow. In this respect, the
main thrust of debate has followed a deterministic
approach whereby this positive relationship between
concentration and profits is explained through the
“structure-conduct-performance” paradigm (Scherer
and Ross, 1990). A highly concentrated structure gives
participants greater pricing power in the market,
leading to monopolistic solutions.
However, the new theory of industrial organization
(Bresnahan, 1989, among others) argues that this
deterministic relationship is debatable, since a high
concentration ratio does not necessarily result from
the use of firms’ market power, but could arise as a
consequence of economic efficiency-seeking. This
efficiency hypothesis states that the advantage
achieved by firms operating in more concentrated
markets derives from their ability to operate at lower
costs. These, in turn, are the outcome of market
strategies built upon a broad range of options (price,
differentiation, targeting) which reformulate the
original structure.
The following section will look at the behaviour
of a firm at the point where it establishes the price that
maximizes its profits, taking into account the potential
heterogeneity of demand.
TABLE 2
Argentina: Takeovers and new entrants
in the market

















Source: Superintendency of Retirement and Pension Fund
Management Companies (SAFJP).
a The merged firm was named Activa-Anticipar.
b The merged firm was named Profesión+Auge.




This section will develop a profit maximization model
for firms participating in the Argentine AFJP market,
whereby companies set prices in accordance with the
characteristics of demand, given the degree of product
differentiation they have previously decided upon.
According to Tirole (1990), prices can adjust more
quickly than product characteristics. With a view to
formalizing this idea, it will be assumed that companies
consider these characteristics when setting their prices.
Suppose there are N firms offering a single good or
service j. Each product has characteristics of its own
denoted by Vj and Hj. The vector Vj represents the special
characteristics of a vertical product differentiation
strategy, essentially the quality of the product supplied
and the advertising effort made. The vector Hj,
meanwhile, represents characteristics of the good that
relate to a horizontal product differentiation strategy.
Firms also use a two-part structure to set non-linear
prices,5  namely a fixed commission in pesos and a
variable commission proportional to the consumer’s
taxable income, of the type:
5
 Two-part pricing was used from the start of the capitalization
system until December 2001.
where pf j represents the fixed commission in pesos, pvj
is the variable commission (which can range from zero
to one) and yi is the taxable income of the consumer i.
pj = pf j + pv j . yi (1)
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The price signals sent out by management
companies to the market can be viewed from two
different perspectives: as a percentage of the affiliate’s
taxable income or as the total amount payable in pesos.
From the first of these perspectives, the existence of a
fixed commission means that the price decreases as the
taxable base income rises, while from the second, the
existence of a variable commission means that the final
price rises with income.
Let us also take two groups of consumers
differentiated by their taxable income levels: one group
with a high income level defined as yA and a second
group with a medium or low income denoted by yB.
Each group of consumers has a different (fixed- and
variable-) price elasticity of demand.
Given the establishment of a non-linear two-part
price, therefore, firms can opt, in accordance with their
target function, to set whichever combination of fixed
and variable prices is most likely to capture the largest
number of affiliates from one of the groups.
Given the difference in elasticities between
consumers, firms have two pricing strategies open to them:
charging a fixed commission that is higher than the market
average and a variable commission that is below the
average or, conversely, charging a fixed commission that
is lower than the system average but a variable commission
that is higher. The decision will depend on the type of
potential affiliates the management company wishes to
attract to maximize its profits.
It is understood that the service offered by
management companies is a normal good whose price
elasticity of demand is negative for both the fixed and
the variable price. It is also established that high-
income consumers would prefer a price composed of a
high fixed commission and a low variable commission,
since this adds up to a smaller proportion of their
income. Medium- and low-income consumers, for their
part, would prefer the opposite pricing structure, as
this represents a smaller proportion of their income.
It is therefore assumed that the variable-price
elasticity of the demand from high-income affiliates is
higher than the variable-price elasticity of the demand
from medium- and low-income consumers, while the
opposite holds for the fixed component of the price.
Accordingly, it is established that:
and (2)
where SjA and SjB are the shares of firm j in the high-
income consumer market and the medium/low-income
consumer market, respectively.
Given this, and assuming that marginal costs are
equal and constant (and thus equal to average costs),6
the profit of firm j is given by:
pj = p j · qj – cj · qj (3)
where:
pj is the profit of firm j
pj is the price of firm j
qj is the quantity sold by firm j
cj is the marginal cost of firm j.
The firm’s profit is given by the difference between
its revenues and costs. The revenue of an AFJP is the
product of the non-linear two-part price it sets and the
number of affiliates (actually contributors) whose
pension funds it manages:
Ij = (p f j  + pvj · yi) · M · sj · (1–mj) (4)
where:
M is the size of the whole market (total affiliates)
yi is the average taxable income of affiliates of type i
sj is the market share accounted for by affiliates of
firm j
mj is the evasion rate of firm j affiliates.
Firms’ revenue depends not only on the number
of affiliates but also on these individuals’ income level
and evasion rate. This evasion rate is the percentage of
affiliates failing to pay their compulsory contributions.
Thus, the expression (1-mj) is the contributor/affiliate
ratio examined in the previous section. A high average
income level among affiliates and a low evasion rate
would imply high revenues, and vice versa.
Considering that the total costs of firm j are the
product of the firm’s average cost and total membership,
the profit function for the firm is given by:
pj = (p f j  + pvj · yi) · M · sj · (1–mj) – cj · M · sj (5)
The exercise of selecting profit-maximizing prices
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Expressions (6) and (7) give the combination of
fixed and variable prices, these being equal to the
difference between the marginal cost and the revenues
from the other type of price, plus a profit margin which
depends negatively on the price elasticity of demand.
The expressions given above show what the price
combinations will be depending on the customer base
the firm is seeking to attract.
Beginning with the expression arrived at for the
fixed price, it should be noted that this depends
negatively on the variable price (the one that is
proportional to income). The smaller the difference
between the variable price and the marginal cost, the
lower the fixed price.
Setting out from this, we assume that there are two
types of management companies, firm j and firm r (for
the sake of analytical simplicity, both have the same
contributor/affiliate ratio).7  The first of these firms seeks
to capture high-income demand, while company r sets
out to meet low-income demand. Given this, the fixed-
price functions of each of the firms are:
The fixed price established by company j is higher
than the fixed price established by firm r, since the
fixed-price elasticity of low-income demand is higher
than the fixed-price elasticity of high-income demand.
Again, the variable price depends negatively on
the level of the fixed price set. It might be suggested
at this point that firm j will set a variable price lower
than the one established by firm r. Both prices are
given by:
Given that the variable-price elasticity of high-
income demand is higher than the variable-price
elasticity of medium- and low-income demand, the
variable price set by firm j is lower than the one set by
firm r. In other words, the freedom to set prices, both
fixed and variable, is limited by the sensitivity of target
demand to these prices.
With these two possible combinations of (fixed
and variable) prices, the total price offered by the firm
to the market in relation to the incomes of consumers
will be as shown in figure 3.
7
 This assumption is made for analytical purposes only. In
practice, differences are observed between groups of firms, the
standard deviation from the average for this indicator (0.35)
being 0.06. Pursuant to the discussion in section III,
heterogeneity in this indicator allows financial differences to
be identified between firms, since while AFJPs receive revenue
only from contributors, they incur costs for their entire customer
portfolio.
In cases where taxable income is lower than yi*, the
final price charged by firms setting out to meet high-
income demand is significantly higher than the price
charged by firms aiming at medium- and low-income
customers. The opposite is true for the body of demand
represented by people with incomes higher than yi*.
These differences in behaviour arise in pursuit of
the main objective, the effort to maximize profits, for
which the two groups of firms find alternative routes.
The first set of companies does this by capturing high-
income affiliates irrespective of market share, while the
second set pursues the objective by trying to sign up as
many affiliates as possible, most of them with medium
or low incomes. The competition between the two
groups of management companies is eased because they
are targeting different segments of demand, although
this is not true of competition between firms belonging
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FIGURE 3
Argentina: Prices charged at different affiliate
income levels, by company demand strategy
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V
The empirical evidence
The price signals sent to the market by each of the
management companies are the “commissions” they
charge their affiliates. From the start of the system until
November 2001, the price charged by each firm had a
two-part structure: a fixed price in pesos and a variable
commission calculated as a percentage of taxable
income. Under this pricing scheme, average
commission in the system fell as taxable income rose.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of effective average
commissions as a percentage of taxable income in the
system. It can be seen that the effective average
commission for the system as a whole held steady over
time until December 2001, when the average market
price fell sharply to 2.24% of taxable income.
This fall occurred because of a reduction in the
cost of disability and life insurance due to the reserves
built up by management companies in 2001. Decree
No. 1495/01, which abolished fixed commissions on
the grounds that their effect on medium- and low-
income consumers was regressive, also came into effect
that month.
From the start of the system to December 2001,
firms can be divided into two groups by structure and
commission level. The first group consists of companies
that charged a high fixed peso commission (compared
to the system average) but with a low variable
component. The second group, conversely, had a low
fixed commission but a high variable component.
Table 3 shows the dispersion of each company’s fixed
commission in relation to the system average in the
period 1995-2001; the ranking is in descending order
by the first column. This table reveals a large dispersion
in the fixed price charged by firms, and the groups
referred to above can be identified accordingly. In 1995,
Generar, Arauca Bit, Claridad and Savia had a fixed
commission of 5 pesos, which was 159% above the
system average. On the other side, there is a second
group of firms with a negative dispersion of some 100%.
These management companies, which included
Consolidar, Futura, Prorenta, San José, Más Vida and
Ethika, either charged no fixed price or had a fixed


























































































































Argentina: Effective average commission, December 1995 to March 2004
(Percentages)
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By September 2001, after a series of mergers and
acquisitions, just two firms, Arauca Bit and Generar,
remained well above the average, charging fixed
commissions that were 200% higher than the system
norm. The other companies were still operating,
although their market shares had altered as a
consequence of the pricing policy changes made by
some of them.8  Similarly, table 4 presents the
percentage dispersion of the variable prices set by the
firms for the period studied. The ranking is by
descending order for the first column. There is a
symmetry with table 3: firms whose fixed commission
showed a dispersion of more than 100% in relation to
the system average had low variable commissions, with
a negative dispersion of more than 16% on average.
These firms were Generar, Arauca Bit, Savia and
Claridad. The dispersion of the remaining firms ranged
from a low of -7.29% to a high of 8.2%.
In 2002, the difference between firms was greater.
At one extreme were Arauca Bit and Met, whose variable
commission had a dispersion of -21% and -13%,
respectively, while the other AFJPs had a dispersion of
between -1.60% (Nación) and 6.45% (Unidos). In March
2004, again, dispersion ranged from -17.75% to 16.35%.
Figures 5 and 6 present the different peso prices
charged by each firm to affiliates by income level in
1999 and 2001. These charts are the real-life version
of the situation depicted in figure 3.
The division of firms into two categories by pricing
structure is confirmed here. Generar and Arauca Bit
had a high fixed commission structure (8.5 pesos on
average) and low variable commission (2.1% of taxable
income), while the other firms (excluding Met, which
began trading in 2001) had the opposite system.9
AFJP\Year 31/12/1995 31/12/1996 31/12/1997 31/12/1998 31/12/1999 31/12/2000 30/09/2001
Generar 158.62 290.70 204.76 208.88 237.12 147.03 176.23
Arauca Bit 158.62 144.19 242.86 247.49 279.25 177.91 210.76
Claridad 158.62 144.19 90.48
Savia 158.62
Siembra 55.17 46.51 14.29 15.83 26.42 -7.36 3.59
Origenes 29.31 22.09 -4.76 -3.47 5.35 -22.80 -13.68
Unidos 29.31 22.09 -4.76 -3.47 5.35 -22.80 -100.00
Patrimonio 16.38 9.88
Ethika-Jacarandá 3.45 -2.33 204.76 208.88
Afianzar 3.45 -2.33 -23.81
Previsol 3.45 -2.33 -23.81 -22.78 -15.72 -22.80 -13.68
Profesión 3.45 -2.33 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00
Previnter 0.86 -4.77 -25.71 -24.71 -17.83 -39.79
Máxima -1.72 -7.21 -27.62 -26.64 -19.94 -24.35 -15.41
Activa-Anticipar -22.41 -26.74
Fecunda -27.59 -31.63 -46.67
Activa -53.45 -100.00
Nación -74.14 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00
Consolidar -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -22.80 -13.68
Futura -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 60.57 79.55
Prorrenta -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -22.80 -13.68
San José -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00
Mas Vida -100.00 -100.00
Ethika -100.00
Met -100.00
System average 1.93 2.05 2.63 2.59 2.37 3.24 2.90
TABLE 3
Argentina: Percentage dispersion of fixed commission
around system average, by firm, 1995-2001
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Superintendency of Retirement and Pension Fund Management Companies (SAFJP).
8
 For example, Consolidar, which had not previously had a fixed
commission, began to charge one in the third quarter of 2000.
9
 Generar was taken over by Siembra in 2002, so that Arauca
Bit and Met were left to represent the first group. The latter,
however, did not charge a fixed commission when it began
trading, even though its variable commission was always below
the system average.
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AFJP\Year 31/12/1995 31/12/1996 31/12/1997 31/12/1998 31/12/1999 31/12/2000 31/12/2001 31/12/2002 31/12/2003 31/03/2004
Generar -19.65 -27.48 -25.54 -31.30 -31.84 -30.41
Arauca Bit -16.56 -14.86 -28.78 -28.03 -28.59 -27.10 -21.28 -20.95 -17.75 -17.75
Savia -11.61
Claridad -8.83 -6.98 -4.50
Futura -7.29 -5.41 -2.88 -1.85 -2.62 -2.24 5.11 4.95 10.33 10.33
Unidos -4.20 -2.25 0.36 1.42 0.62 2.73 6.45 6.29 14.34 14.34
Ethika-Jacarandá -1.11 -11.71 -22.30 -21.48
Más Vida 0.44 2.48
Orígenes 0.44 2.48 5.22 6.32 5.49 7.70 5.11 4.95 4.31 4.31
Consolidar 1.98 4.05 6.83 7.96 7.12 7.70 3.76 3.61 3.91 3.91
Ethika 1.98
Previnter 1.98 4.05 6.83 7.96 7.12 9.36
Previsol 1.98 4.05 6.83 7.96 7.12 7.70 2.42 2.27 1.50 1.50
Profesión 1.98 4.05 3.60 -1.85 -2.62 -0.59 5.11 1.82 -13.74 -13.74
Activa-Anticipar 3.53 5.63
Afianzar 3.53 -2.25 0.36
Máxima 3.53 5.63 8.45 9.60 8.74 7.04 2.42 2.27 4.31 4.31
Patrimonio 5.07 7.21
San José 5.07 7.21 10.07 11.23
Siembra 5.07 7.21 10.07 11.23 10.36 7.70 2.87 2.72 16.35 16.35
Activa 8.16
Fecunda 8.16 4.05 6.83
Nación 8.16 2.48 5.22 6.32 5.49 -0.59 -1.60 -1.75 -5.72 -5.72
Prorrenta 8.16 10.36 13.31 14.50 13.61 11.01 2.42 6.74 -4.11 -4.11
Met -12.78 -12.91 -13.74 -13.74
System average 3.24 3.17 3.09 3.06 3.08 3.02 2.24 2.24 2.49 2.49
TABLE 4
Argentina: Percentage dispersion of variable commission
around system average, by firm, 1995-2004
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Superintendency of Retirement and Pension Fund Management Companies (SAFJP).
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FIGURE 5
Argentina: Prices charged by firms up the income scale, pesos, 1999
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In 1999, marginal individuals were those with a
taxable income of 1,200 pesos and 900 pesos,
respectively, depending on whether Arauca Bit or
Generar is considered. In 2001, the income values were
1,100 pesos and 900 pesos.
As a preliminary conclusion, two groups of firms
can be identified on the basis of their pricing structures:
on the one hand, firms that set a high fixed commission
and a low variable commission, and on the other, firms
with the opposite pricing strategy.
With a view to associating this differentiation in
pricing combinations with a strategy of market
segmentation by consumer income level, figure 7 shows
the relationship between the average taxable income
of affiliates and the fixed commission set by each AFJP
for 2001.
Figure 7 excludes Met because it had a group of
high-income affiliates (with an average salary of 2,391
pesos) but no fixed commission. The linear association
between the two variables can be clearly observed,
suggesting a positive relationship between fixed
commission and affiliates’ taxable income. Taking the
whole of the period studied, the simple correlation
index between the two variables is 0.60.
FIGURE 6




































Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Superintendency of Retirement and Pension Fund Management Companies (SAFJP).
Arauca Bit Consolidar Futura Generar Máxima
Met Nación Orígenes Previsol Profesión
Prorenta Siembra Unidos
Similarly, figure 8 presents the relationship
between average affiliate income and variable
commission in 2001. There is once again a significant
relationship, negative in this case, between variable
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the
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commission levels and affiliate incomes. Like the
previous one, this chart excludes Met, which, in
addition to establishing a low variable commission,
took two additional measures to draw in more high-
income affiliates. The first was its decision not to
charge a fixed commission, and the second was its use
of a business model based on branches and salesmen
that targeted this group of consumers.
Again, as the last two charts show, there was
significant dispersion between AFJP groups in the
average income of their affiliates (the system average
was 964 pesos). The average income of Arauca Bit,
Generar and Met affiliates was 1,833 pesos, while
affiliates of all the other system participants had an
average income of 703 pesos. Both strategies had one
and the same objective: to maximize average revenues.
The profit equation (5) shows that the average revenues
of each management company depended on the pricing
structure established by the firm, the average income
of its affiliates and the contributor/affiliate ratio.
On the basis of quarterly panel data for the period
between December 1995 and September 2001, the
linear average revenue function was estimated in
natural logarithms, using least squares with fixed and
random effects. The explanatory variables defined are
the fixed price, the variable commission, average
consumer income for each firm and the contributor/
affiliate ratio. Table 5 shows the results.
The estimate arrived at using a fixed-effects
intragroup estimator model is the one that fits best with
the Hausman test. Nonetheless, and in relation to the
material analysed above, the explanatory variables of
the model are partially correlated among themselves.
This creates a problem of imperfect multicolinearity
in the estimate, which means that the effect each of
them has upon the dependent variable cannot be
separated out. Given that this does not negate the
significance of any of the coefficients estimated,
however, and that the purpose of the present exercise
is to ascertain the sign of these, the estimators are still
the “best linear unbiased estimators” (BLUEs).
With a good explanation of total variance (0.85),
the results obtained are as expected. Variable
commissions have a negative effect on firms’ average
revenues, while fixed commissions have the opposite
effect. Again, affiliate income levels and the contributor/
affiliate ratio have a positive effect on the average
revenues of management companies. In summary, firms
with lower variable commissions and higher fixed
commissions obtain the highest revenues per affiliate.
The larger the proportion of high-income affiliates in
their customer base, and the higher the ratio of actual
contributors, the stronger this positive effect is.
This being so, a higher contributor/affiliate ratio
should mean higher average revenues and a better
3.35
2.1
















variable commission and average
affiliate income, 2001
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the
Superintendency of Retirement and Pension Fund Management
Companies (SAFJP).
TABLE 5
Argentina: Estimated natural logarithms
of average company revenue
Dependent variable: ln (average revenue)
Variable Fixed effect Random effect
ln (variable price) -0.9144465a -1.258644a
(0.3063558) (0.2462656)
ln (fixed price) 0.1174472b 0.0071327
(0.0680741) (0.0536171)
ln (average affiliate income) 0.1490118a 0.2384462a
(0.0661792) (0.0561991)




   
No. of observations 269 269
R2 0.8561 0.8761
F 141.67
Prob > F 0.000
Wald Chi2 736.99
Prob > Ch2  0.000
Source: Prepared by the author.
a Statistically significant at the 1% level.
b Statistically significant at the 5% level.
c Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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financial performance, giving firms a greater capacity
not only to survive in the market, but also to price
their services more competitively. And the firms with
the highest contributor/affiliate ratio are those that
concentrate their efforts on high-income demand:
Arauca Bit, Generar and Met.
This can be put down to the greater contribution
payment capacity of high-income consumers, as a result
of various factors such as a continuous record of formal
employment and a greater financial capacity to cope
with negative income shocks.10
The results obtained bear out the hypothesis of a
price discrimination policy operated by two groups of
clearly identified companies with a view to segmenting
the market by the income level of demand, and to
maximizing average revenues.
One group of firms maximizes revenues by
increasing total membership irrespective of affiliate
income levels, so that average revenues are low, while
a second set of firms maximizes its revenues by
attracting high-wage affiliates who are very likely to
maintain an uninterrupted record of monthly
contributions.
This raises a question: why did those management
companies that concentrated on meeting medium- and
low-income demand not react and change their business
approach, particularly where pricing was concerned,
so as to meet the demand from high earners and thus
increase their average revenues?
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the employed
economically active population by monthly income
level in 2000. It can be seen that in 2000 the average
income of the employed economically active
population was 528.9 pesos, with a dispersion of 639.8
pesos. Thus, the population was concentrated in the
lower-income brackets, while higher-income
individuals represented the smallest share of the total.
For this reason, it may be suggested that while
there is great dispersion in the income level of demand
(employed economically active population), high-
income consumers account for only a small share of
the total market; consequently, the entry of new
competitors into this segment would destroy any
existing economies of scale, forcing a reduction in the
number of management companies targeting it.
Decree No. 1495/01, which abolished fixed
commissions, was approved in November 2001,
reducing the potentially regressive effect of
commissions on lower-income affiliates. Since then,
companies have only been allowed to set a single
variable commission calculated as a percentage of the
affiliate’s taxable income, which limits the scope for
segmenting demand and forces them to set a single
price (proportion of taxable income).
Figure 10 clearly shows how marginal individuals
drop out of the equation, since there is just one type of
price, in the form of a proportion of taxable income,
and it is therefore technically impossible to segment
the market.
FIGURE 9
Argentina: Distribution of the employed











Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the Permanent
Household Survey of the National Institute of Statistics and
Censuses (INDEC, 2000).
10
 An alternative hypothesis is that higher-income workers are
those with more information and thus a greater appreciation of
the future.
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Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Superintendency of Retirement and Pension Fund Management Companies (SAFJP).
With the passing of Law No. 24241, in force since July
1994, the Integrated Pensions System (SIJP) came into
effect to cover the contingencies of old age, disability
and death. This system consisted of two regimes: a
public-sector regime of State-provided benefits
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and managed by
the National Social Security Administration (ANSES),
and a regime based on individual capitalization and
operated by private-sector enterprises, namely the
pension fund management companies (AFJPs).
The private-sector capitalization system has grown
to a significant size since then, as the membership of
that system has grown by more than that of the pension
system as a whole, rising from a share of 66.7% of the
total in 1996 to 79.2% in 2002. Meanwhile, not only
did membership of the pay-as-you-go regime decrease
as a proportion of total system membership, but it
actually fell in numerical terms as affiliates left it for
the new private capitalization system, experiencing a
negative variation of 13.66% between the two years.
Considering the results set out in section III of this
paper, the AFJP market in Argentina has undergone a
significant process of concentration, with the top four
firms eventually capturing 72% of the market. This is
a result both of mergers and acquisitions in the industry
and of the regulatory framework governing the
allocation of “undecideds” to management companies,
chiefly in the early years of the system.
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From the creation of the new private-sector
capitalization regime to December 2001, management
companies used a two-part non-linear charging
method: a fixed component in pesos and a variable
commission calculated as a percentage of the affiliate’s
taxable income.
As a consequence of this, two identifiable groups
of firms emerged. The first consisted of management
companies that set a high fixed commission and a low
variable commission (in relation to the system average)
with a view to capturing high-income affiliates. These
included Arauca Bit, Met and Generar. The second
consisted of companies that employed the opposite
pricing policy with a view to capturing medium- and
low-income affiliates.
This phenomenon is explained by differences in
the price elasticities of demand. High-income affiliates
have a lower fixed-price elasticity than medium- and
low-income affiliates, given the percentage share of
the fixed price in total revenue. Conversely, the
variable-price elasticity of the former is higher than
that of medium- and low-income affiliates.
Both these differentiated strategies were designed
for a single objective: to maximize average revenues.
One group of firms maximized revenues by increasing
total membership irrespective of affiliate pay levels,
giving low average revenues; a second set of firms,
conversely, maximized their revenues by attracting
high-income affiliates who were very likely to sustain
a continuous record of monthly contributions.
In accordance with the profits function established
in the present study, and on the basis of a quarterly
panel of data from December 1995 to September 2001,
the linear average revenue function was estimated in
natural logarithms using least squares with fixed effects.
The explanatory variables defined were the fixed price,
the variable price, the affiliate’s average wage and the
contributor/affiliate ratio.
The results obtained suggest that variable
commissions have a negative effect on companies’
average revenues, while fixed commissions have the
opposite effect. Again, affiliate pay levels and the
contributor/affiliate ratio have a positive effect on
management companies’ average revenues. In
summary, firms with lower variable commissions and
higher fixed commissions obtain the highest revenues
per affiliate. The larger the share of high-income
affiliates in their demand, and the higher the proportion
of actual contributors, the more powerful this effect is.
This, then, is confirmation of the hypothesis of a
price discrimination policy operated by two groups of
clearly identified companies with a view to segmenting
the market by the income level of demand, and to
maximizing average revenues.
Nonetheless, the size of the high-income
population meant that it was not economically efficient
for new participants to concentrate on this segment of
demand, since economies of scale would have been
lost and average revenues would consequently have
fallen to a point where some firms would have been
forced out of the market.
The possibility of segmenting demand enabled
participating companies to compete less on price and
returns, since each group of AFJPs had some scope for acting
in an oligopolistic manner within its own market segment.
This entailed the establishment of a non-competitive
equilibrium resulting in losses of surplus to consumers.
In 2002, the regulator sought to do away with the
regressive effects of fixed commissions by banning the
use of two-part tariffs. Since that year, companies have
been required to charge a variable commission
proportional to individual affiliate incomes. There is
thus no technical scope for segmenting the market and
a Bertrand game can be expected to ensue. However,
there are alternative mechanisms for avoiding price
competition in the whole market, such as product
differentiation, targeted business approaches and tacit
agreements that prevent an efficient market
equilibrium from being attained.
What is required is the active involvement of the
regulator, including the design of instruments to
monitor closely the behaviour not just of supply (price
levels, spending, type of advertising, etc.) but of
demand as well, and to generate a greater flow of
information to improve the decision-making of
individuals, all this in a broader context of analysis
that includes the cost structure of the industry, product
differentiation policies and strategic behaviour.
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